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Abstract
This paper proposes, for the first time, the use of
re-encryption scheme to improve users privacy in a
privacy-enhancing system. Firstly, a secure protocol to
distribute a re-encryption key from a user A to a ser-
vice provider B, with the help of n referees, is pro-
posed. Next, this re-encryption key distribution protocol
is combined with an existing private credential system to
provide a protocol for conditional revocation of private
information. This protocol has a strong accountability
property with efficient online performance. It does not
assume the existence of a single trusted entity. We toler-
ate up to t dishonest referees (t ≤ n − 1), while A and
B are dishonest and do not trust each other.
1. Introduction
Privacy is an increasingly important requirement in
identity management systems. Consider a scenario
where a user A is interacting with a service provider B
who sells goods online. In a privacy enhancing environ-
ment, A can be conditionally anonymous. For security
and accountability purposes, B needs an assurance that
under certain conditions (such as in a situation whereby
B realizes that the goods sold have serious health and
safety concerns and therefore needs to contact A), B can
obtain the necessary private information about A so that
appropriate corrective actions can be taken. We call this
scenario conditional revelation of private information -
CRPI [2].
The private credential system (PCS) [2] has been pro-
posed to address such a scenario. The PCS approach is
to encrypt private information in such a way that only a
trusted third party (also known as the anonymity revo-
cation manager - ARM ) can decrypt the escrowed pri-
vate information when a set of conditions attached to
the encrypted text is satisfied, and B can verify that the
encrypted text (which was encrypted under the ARM ’s
public key) contains the correct private information that
has been certified by some trusted entities without learn-
ing the value of the private information itself. We call
such encryption verifiable.
These cryptographic schemes demonstrate that cryp-
tographic primitives can be usefully applied to the CRPI
problem. However, they place too much trust on ARM .
An ARM may decrypt the escrowed information, even
when the attached conditions remain unfulfilled: the at-
tached conditions are not enforceable except through the
‘trust’ that the ARM can properly and honestly assess
the fulfillment of the attached conditions.
One attempt to address such a trust problem is pro-
posed in [14] whereby PCS is combined with univer-
sal custodian-hiding verifiable encryption (UCHVE) -
we henceforth call this approach UCHVE-PCS. The
UCHVE-PCS approach in [14] distributes the trust be-
tween the ARM and a set of referees. However, the
UCHVE-PCS approach [14] has accountability and effi-
ciency problems. If A’s private information is misused,
it is not clear as to who is responsible for such misuse be-
cause the UCHVE-PCS approach allows any one of the
referees, ARM or B to learn A’s private information.
In addition, UCHVE-PCS [14] suffers from severe com-
putational inefficiency due to the large number of online
modular exponentiations that need to be performed.
This paper proposes a new mechanism to improve the
UCHVE-PCS approach [14] by using an existing proxy
re-encryption (PRE) scheme proposed by Ateniese et
al (2006) [1]. PRE has been used in the area of se-
cure file storage, access control, and delegations. To
our knowledge, this is the first time that PRE has been
used to enhance privacy and improve accountability in
a privacy-enhancing environment (such as CRPI) where
parties mutually distrust each other. Informally, PRE
allows an entity (such as a proxy) that possesses a re-
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encryption key from A to B (denoted as rkA→B) to
transform a ciphertext Ciphera (which was originally
encrypted for A) to another ciphertext Cipherb, which
can be directly decrypted by B without the proxy learn-
ing anything about the content of Ciphera. Details of
the re-encryption scheme [1] are provided in section 2.1
However, the PRE scheme [1] cannot be readily ap-
plied to solve the CRPI scenario. The PRE scheme [1]
assumes that the proxy is trusted and will not abuse its
power to re-encrypt ciphertexts. Such assumption of a
trusted third party is precisely what we do not want to
have. Therefore, in order to use PRE, we need to firstly
propose a protocol to securely distribute a one-time re-
encryption key rkA→B . Then, we propose a method to
combine PRE with PCS to remove the need of a single
trusted entity (such as ARM ), and to provide better ac-
countability and efficiency as compared to the UCHVE-
PCS approach [14].
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are:
(1) A new protocol that provides the secure release
of re-encryption key rkA→B for PRE scheme [1] -
we henceforth call this protocol the Re-encryption Key
Distribution protocol (RKD). RKD adds to the exist-
ing PRE scheme [1] a secure way to distribute the re-
encryption key (in [1], no protocol is provided on how a
re-encryption key should be distributed), (2) a method to
apply the RKD protocol with PCS so that it removes the
need for a single trusted entity, and provides better ac-
countability and efficiency - we henceforth call this com-
bination RKD-PCS, and (3) a brief performance analy-
sis of RKD-PCS to show that it is more efficient than the
UCHVE-PCS approach [14].
Application RKD-PCS can be usefully applied in en-
vironments where privacy is important, such as in the
medical field. Users generally prefer to be anonymous
and have their health information private, while at the
same time, certain conditions - such as when a user has
been diagnosed with a highly infectious disease - require
the user’s anonymity and private information to be re-
voked. In addition, given that medical information is
generally regarded as sensitive, we also want to ensure
the accountability of such revocation capability action to
prevent the abuse of such revocation capability. RKD-
PCS provides the necessary properties to be applicable
in such an environment.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 de-
scribes the cryptographic primitives that RKD uses.
1The PRE schemes should not be confused with the universal re-
encryption scheme [10] whereby it simply re-randomizes the cipher-
text
Section 3 describes the RKD protocol. Section 4 pro-
vides the details of RKD-PCS system. Section 5 pro-
vides a brief analysis of the performance of RKD-PCS.
2. Cryptographic Schemes and Notations
The cryptographic schemes that will be used in RKD
are briefly explained. Readers who are interested in the
details, including security proofs, should refer to the
original papers referenced.
Notation ma,mb...mj are plaintext data items.
Cipherscheme−mi = Encscheme(mi;K
i
pubscheme
)
is an encryption of a data item mi using the
Encscheme encryption scheme under i’s public
encryption key. The plaintext can only be recov-
ered by i who has the corresponding private key:
mi = Decscheme(Cipherscheme−mi ;K
i
privscheme
). A
signature Smi over a message mi can only be produced
using i’s private signing key: Smi = Sign(mi;Kisign).
Anybody can verify the signature using the public veri-
fication key of i: V erifySign(Smi ;mi;Kiverify) = 1
(valid) or 0 (invalid).
Let a mapping e : G1 x G1 → G2 is bilinear if:
(1) G1, G2 are both of the same prime order q, (2) for
all a, b ∈ Zq , g ∈ G1, e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab, and (3)
the map is non-degenerate: if G1 = 〈g〉, then G2 =
〈e(g, g)〉.
2.1. Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme
A proxy re-encryption scheme allows a proxy that
possesses the appropriate re-encryption key rkX→Y to
transform a ciphertext that was originally encrypted for
an entity X , to the one that can be decrypted by an-
other entity Y , but reveals nothing about the plaintext
to the proxy. Normally, we call X the delegator and Y
the delegatee. A delegator supplies the appropriate re-
encryption key to the proxy.
There are several re-encryption schemes, such as [1,
11]. In this paper, the RKD is based on the proxy re-
encryption scheme proposed in [1].2
A brief description of the re-encryption scheme pro-
posed in [1] is provided: the system parameters for the
PRE scheme [1] are random generators g ∈ G1 and Z =
e(g, g) ∈ G2. X’s public keys are pkx = (Zx1 , gx2),
and the secret keys skx = (x1, x2). The value gx2 is
only needed when X is willing to be a delegatee. Also
2We use the ‘third attempt’ version of the scheme. The later
‘temporary unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme’ uses a trusted
server, which is inapplicable in this paper
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assume a delegatee Y with the public keys (Zy1 , gy2)
and secret keys sky = (y1, y2). Knowing gy2 , X can
generate a re-encryption key rkX→Y : (gy2)x1 .
There are two types of encryptions in this scheme:
first-level and second-level encryption. A message en-
crypted using the first-level encryption algorithm can
only be decrypted by X , therefore, it cannot be re-
encrypted. A message encrypted using the second-level
encryption algorithm can be decrypted by X and can be
re-encrypted to a delegatee (such as Y ). To do first-level
encryption of a message m ∈ G2 under pkx, compute
Cipher1stPRE−m = (Zx1k,mZk). Cipher1stPRE−m
can only be decrypted by X who knows skx, and it can-
not be re-encrypted. To do a second-level encryption of
m, compute Cipher2ndPRE−m = (gk,mZx1k).
A proxy who has Cipher2ndPRE−m and knows
gx1y2 can re-encrypt Cipher2ndPRE−m to be
Y ’s first-level encryption as follows: compute
e(gk, gx1y2) = Zx1y2k, and output the re-encrypted
ciphertext CipherPREX→Y −m = (Zx1y2k,mZx1k) =
(α, β). Y who knows the value of y2 can decrypt
CipherPREX→Y −m by compute m = β/(α)1/y2 .
Such re-encryption scheme is single-hop: a re-
encrypted message must be in its first-level encryption
format, and therefore cannot be re-encrypted further.
Whiel this may be a limitation, in some applications -
such as in a privacy-enhanced environment, the single-
hop property is very useful as an assurance that a re-
encrypted message can only be decrypted by the chosen
delegatee, not anybody else.
2.2. Feldman’s Verifiable Secret Sharing
Feldman’s verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme [9]
is as follows: assume a secret s which is ‘distributed’ to
n participants by giving each participant a ‘share’ of the
secret. To construct the secret s, any t + 1 out of n
(t ≤ n − 1) shares have to be collected before s can be
reconstructed. Any t or less will not reveal any valuable
information of s.
The public parameters required to share s is a group
Zq with prime order q, and g ∈ Zq. To share s
so that any t + 1 participants can reconstruct it, com-
pute a random polynomial of degree t: Q(x) = a0 +
a1x + a2x2 + ... + atxt, where a0 = s. Then
compute the commitments: ri = gai mod p for
i = 0, 1, ..., t. The values r0, r1, ..., rt are made pub-
lic. Each participant j (j = 1, 2, ..., n) is given a
share calculated as: sj = Q(j). Each participant
j can verify that it has received a correct share w.r.t
s by verifying that gsj = (r0)(r1)j(r2)j
2
...(rt)j
t
=
(ga0)(ga1j)(ga2j
2
)...(gatj
t
) = gQ(j) mod p. As long
as there are at least t+1 of the shares, s can be recovered
using the Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm [12].
An interesting property of Feldman’s VSS scheme is
that the value of r0 = ga0 = gs is known to the pub-
lic. While this has been criticized as a weakness (since
r0 leaks information about s), as we shall see in RKD,
this is the property we want. While r0 leaks information
about s, the value of s still cannot be recovered due to
the hardness of the discrete log problem.
3. A New Re-encryption Key Distribution
Protocol (RKD)
The entities involved in RKD are: A - the delegator,
and whose rkA→B is to be protected, B - the delega-
tee, and a group of referees R. As the existing PRE
scheme [1] provides no details on how rkA→B can be
distributed, RKD is thus proposed to fill this gap.
RKD allows a re-encryption key rkA→B for the PRE
scheme in [1] to be securely distributed from A to B,
removing the need for a trusted ‘proxy’. RKD has two
stages: the Initiation stage, which is used to distribute
some information required to form the re-encryption key
amongst B and the referees (note that step 1 to 3 of the
RKD Initiation stage are not part of the existing PRE
scheme [1]), and the Construction stage, which is used
to construct the re-encryption key rkA→B from the in-
formation distributed earlier.
3.1. Security Requirements of RKD
For RKD, we use the well-known basic security re-
quirements based on [3], with slight modifications.
Main requirement Implicit key authentication: this
property is achieved when A is assured that only B can
form the re-encryption key rkA→B .
Desirable requirements Known-key security: in a
session, this property is achieved when implicit key au-
thentication is still attainable in the face of adversaries
who manage to learn the previous sessions re-encryption
keys. Unknown key-share security: an adversary C must
not be able to deceive A into believing that he is dis-
tributing the re-encryption key to B, while it is actually
C whom A is distributing the key to. Forward secrecy: if
long-term private keys of the entities are compromised,
the secrecy of the previous encrypted messages are not
affected. Half forward secrecy is the situation whereby
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the adversary only compromises one entity’s private key.
Key-compromise impersonation security: if an adversary
C obtains B’s long term private key, it is obvious that C
can impersonate as B. However, this property states that
in such a situation, C must not be able to impersonate as
another party D to B.
As RKD involves the referees, and as A and B do not
trust each other, few additional requirements are needed:
Zero-knowledge Referee: referees must not learn any in-
formation for the purpose of forming other re-encryption
keys with A as the delegator. Correctness: B must be
able to verify A’s correct behavior as per the protocol,
that is, we do not want A to be able to behave in such a
way that the re-encryption key cannot be correctly gen-
erated by B even after B is authorized to do so. By
‘authorized’, we mean the situation where there are t+1
referees who agree that B can generate the re-encryption
key. Private key secrecy: we do not want B (or the ref-
erees) to learn the value of ska because knowing such
value defeats the accountability property that RKD pro-
vides (detailed discussion in section 4.3). While ska by
definition is private, a badly designed RKD may, as a
result unintentionally reveal ska to B (recall that a re-
encryption key contains information of A’s private key).
We assume the following RKD threat environment:
• Dishonest B who will attempt to obtain the re-
encryption key rkA→B whenever it can.
• Dishonest A (user) who may provide false informa-
tion such that rkA→B cannot be formed properly
• Honest referees (Rh ⊂ R) with a small subset of
at most t (t ≥ 1) dishonest referees (Rdh ⊂ R,
Rh ∪ Rdh = R, Rh ∩ Rdh = ∅, Rdh << Rh).
Rdh may collude amongst themselves to try to
obtain enough information to generate a new re-
encryption key rkA→Rdh . Referees want to protect
their reputations.
A and B do not trust each other. We allow collusion
among dishonest referees. Dishonest referees may col-
lude with B. No collusion between A and B (or Rdh)
as such collusion is unlikely due to their conflicting in-
terests (A wants to protect his/her private information,
while B, and Rdh want to reveal such information).
3.2. RKD - Initiation stage
Assume A has the following public and private key
pair: pka = Za1 , ska = a1. B has the following
key pair: pkb = (Zb1 , gb2), ska = (b1, b2). The re-
encryption key rkA→B is therefore ga1b2 . We are not
concerned with A being a delegatee. We assume that A
uses pka, ska once only (see discussion about one-time
use requirement in section 3.4.1). We assume the use of
confidentiality- and integrity-protected communication
channels between entities. Refer to Figure 1.
1. A chooses a random number r ∈ Zq , and calculates
z0 = gr and z1 = (gb2)a1/r.
2. A encrypts z0 and z1 using first-level PRE en-
cryption to B to generate Cipher1stPRE−z0 and
Cipher1stPRE−z1 . A sends both encrypted z0 and
z1 to B and indicates that the secret discrete log
value of z0 will be shared amongst n referees.
3. B who has the secret value b1 decrypts
Cipher1stPRE−z0 and Cipher1stPRE−z1 .
Then B, who also has the secret value b2,
verifies that e(z0, z1) = (Za1)b2 (that is:
e(z0, z1) = e(gr, ga1b2/r) = e(g, g)a1b2r/r =
e(g, g)a1b2 = Za1b2 ). B also verifies that the
discrete log value of z0 is indeed r by calculating:
(z1)1/b2 = (ga1b2/r)1/b2 = ga1/r. Then, pair
e(ga1/r, z0) = e(ga1/r, gr) = e(g, g)a1r/r = Za1 .
(a) If the above verification succeeds, then B
only knows that the multiplication of the dis-
crete log value of z0 and z1 must result in
a1b2 while the value of a1 remains hidden
(due to the discrete log problem).
(b) If the above verification fails, stops.
4. A then shares the secret value r, in relation to z0
among n referees (here, we use the term prox-
ies and referees interchangeably). We can use the
Feldman’s VSS scheme to share the discrete log
of z0. In particular, we need to have the value of
r0 = gr = z0, and that the value of r0, r1, ...rt that
A provides to all of the n referees are consistent.
(a) Let A generate a polynomial Q(x) of degree
t (with the value of a0 = r), and the commit-
ments: c0...t = r0, r1, ...rt (with the value of
r0 = ga0 = gr).
(b) A publishes the commitments c0...t.
(c) For each referees refj (j = 1...n, t ≤ n− 1),
A generates the share sj accordingly, and
sends the share to each refj . A can option-
ally include a set of conditions Conditions to
specify the conditions which have to be satis-
fied before a referee is allowed to release the
given share.
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(d) Each referee verifies the given share sj in
relation to the published commitments c0...t
according to Feldman’s VSS scheme (see
section 2.2). Each referee sends to A: a
statement stat = ‘statement that a correct
share is received’ + the signature: Sjstat =
Sign(stat, Conditions, c0...t;K
refereej
sign ). 3
(e) As soon as A receives at least t+1 statements
from the referees, A sends to B the t + 1 (or
more) signed statements from the referees.
5. For j = 1...n, B verifies: V erifySign
(Sjstat;stat,Conditions,c0...t;Krefereejverify ) = 1. If
there are at least t + 1 valid Sstat, then B knows
that there are at least t + 1 referees who can col-
laborate to recover the secret r. The referees never
learn the identity of B in the process. Therefore,
referees cannot easily collude with B.
3.3. RKD - Construction stage
1. B requests the referees to reconstruct r by multi-
casting the value of c0...t to all referees.
2. Each referee verifies if the Conditions attached to
the commitments c0...t is satisfied. If so, the referee
sends the share sj to B. Otherwise, a referee should
not send the share.
3. For j = 1...n, B verifies the given share s(j):
gsj = (r0)(r1)j(r2)j
2
...(rt)j
t
. As long as B re-
ceives t+ 1 valid shares, B can recover r.
4. B generates the re-encryption key rkA→B by first
validating that e(zr1 , g) = Z(a1b2/r)×r = Za1b2 .
The rkA→B is thus zr1 = g(a1b2/r)×r = ga1b2
3.4. Security Analysis
The proposed RKD protocol achieves the implicit key
authentication, known-key security, unknown key-share
security, correctness, and zero-knowledge referee prop-
erties under the assumptions that the discrete log (DL)
and bilinear discrete log (BDL) problem are hard, and
that there are at most t dishonest referees. The half for-
ward secrecy property is also achieved. BDL problem
can be defined as follows: given (g, gx, gy), find z such
that e(gx, gy) = e(g, g)z . Please refer to the full version
of this paper [13] for the details.
3For better privacy protection, A can request the referees to gen-
erate Sstat using a secure group signature scheme. By doing so, B
will not learn, from receiving t+1 or more signatures in step 4(e), the
identities of the referees who have the shares.
3.4.1 One-time Re-encryption Key
At the end of RKD, the value of rkA→B is revealed to B.
Consequently, B can now re-encrypt and then decrypt
all of A’s 2nd-level encrypted messages (recall that 2nd-
level encrypted messages using the PRE scheme pro-
posed by Ateniese 2006 [1] can be re-encrypted, while
1st-level encrypted messages cannot - see section 2.1).
Therefore, it is crucial that A only uses the key pair
pka, ska once only. This may appear to be a limitation,
however, as we are operating in a privacy-enhancing en-
vironment, such one-time key use requirement is almost
inevitable in order to achieve unlinkability property be-
tween session: if A uses the same public key to encrypt
messages over multiple sessions, then it is trivial to link
these sessions to the same user A. Therefore, using a
one-time re-encryption key pair is in fact essential in a
privacy-enhancing environment.
4. Using RKD with PCS for Conditional
Revelation of Private Data Items
In this section, we show how we can use RKD with
PCS. First, we briefly describes PCS in more detail, in-
cluding the additional notations. Next, we show how
RKD can be applied to the PCS scheme explained ear-
lier, and show the advantages and disadvantages of this
approach as compared to the UCHVE-PCS approach
[14] in terms of security and performance.
More Notation A commitment cmi of a data item mi
is generated using a Commit algorithm, along with a
random value r: cmi = Commit(mi, r). A commit-
ment is hiding if it does not show any computational in-
formation on mi, and binding if it is computationally
impossible to find another m′i and r
′
as inputs to the
same Commit algorithm that gives a value c′mi = cmi .
PK{(ma): F (ma,mb...mi) = 1} refers to a zero
knowledge proof interactive protocol (PK). PK is ex-
ecuted between a Prover and a Verifier. The data on the
left of the colon ma is the data item that a Prover needs
to prove the knowledge of such that the statements on the
right side of the colon, F (ma,mb...mi) = 1, is correct.
A verifier will not learn the data on the left hand side of
the colon, while other parameters are known. The actual
protocol involves one or more message exchange(s). At
the end of the protocol, a verifier will be convinced (or
not) that the prover has the knowledge of ma without the
verifier learning it.
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Initiation
B A Referees(1...n)
Cipher1stPRE−z0 , Cipher1stPRE−z1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Decrypts and calculates: (z1)1/b2 = ga1/r
Verifies:e(z0, z1) = (Za1)b2 , e(ga1/r, z0) = Za1
For each referee, refj(j = 1...n) sends:
s(j)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verifies:gsj = (r0)(r1)j ...(rt)j
t
stat1...t+1,...n, S1...t+1...nstat←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− stat
1...t+1,...n, S1...t+1...nstat←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verifies: S1...t+1...nstat
Construction:
B Referees(1...n)
Multicasts to referees: c0...t−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verifies fulfillment of Conditions
s(j)1...t+1,...n←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Recover r, and calculate: zr1 = ga1b2
Figure 1. Re-encryption Key Distribution
4.1. Private Credential System
The private credential system (PCS) proposed in [2]
provides many useful privacy-enhancing services. For
the purpose of this paper, only the ‘conditional revela-
tion of private data items’ is elaborated.
In PCS, unlike the ‘usual’ certificate (such as X509
certificate), a certificate Cert1 issued to a user ua is a
signature of CertificateIssuer1 over a collection of
data items (ma,mb, ...mj) using one of the Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya signature schemes [5, 6]:
Cert1 = Sign(ma,mb, ...mj ;K
CertificateIssuer1
sign ). A
user ua should keep Cert1 private.
The conditional revelation of these private data
items (ma, ...mj) is accomplished as follows:
assume we need to escrow private data items
ma...me, and reveal mf ...mj to B. The data
items ma...me are blinded using a commitment
scheme, for example, ca = Commit(ma, r). Then,
each of the value ma...me (which are hidden in
ca...ce) is encrypted using the Camenisch-Shoup
verifiable encryption scheme (CSVE) [7] under the
ARM public encryption key, along with a set of
pre-determined Conditions: CipherCSV E−ma =
EncCSV E(ma;Conditions;KARMpublic−CSV E) (similar
operation applied to mb...me). Then, a PK is executed
to prove that ca...ce are the commitments for ma...me
contained in Cert1 issued by CertificateIssuer1 (this
is achieved by using the proof of knowledge of a signa-
ture on committed messages technique based on one of
the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature schemes [5, 6]
depending on which signature scheme was used to
generate Cert1 is - see [5, 6] for details). This PK
also proves that CipherCSV E−ma ...CipherCSV E−me
are encryption of ma...me hidden in ca...ce, under the
ARM public key:
PK{(Cert1,ma...me) :ca = Commit(ma, r)∧
cb = Commit(mb, r) ∧ ...∧
V erifySign(ma, ..,mj ;K
CertificateIssuer1
verify ) = 1∧
CipherCSV E−ma =EncCSV E(ma;Conditions;
KARMpublic−CSV E) ∧ ...∧
CipherCSV E−me =EncCSV E(me;Conditions;
KARMpublic−CSV E) (1)
The above protocol allows a user to provide a
verifiable encryption of ma...me without the veri-
fier learning its value and still be convinced that
the ciphertexts contain the correct value. However,
CipherCSV E−ma ...CipherCSV E−me can be trivially
decrypted by the ARM without the user’s knowledge,
and there is no enforcement of Conditions fulfillment.
Our RKD protocol, combined with the existing PCS,
seeks to rectify this problem.
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4.2. Applying RKD to PCS
In this section, we show how RKD can be combined
with PCS to improve its conditional revelation of pri-
vate data items capability. RKD-PCS consists of the
setup stage, private information escrow stage, key es-
crow stage, and finally the revocation stage.
Setup For the purpose of this paper, consider that a
user A has Cert1 which B accepts as a source of the
user’s personal information. Cert1 is verified using
the verification key KCertifcateIssuer1verify . Cert1 contains
ma,mb, ...mj . It is assumed that A and B have agreed
on a set of Conditions before starting the protocol. The
Conditions should include a one-time unique value so
that each set of Conditions is unique.
Private Information Escrow This stage is similar to
the one in PCS explained in section 4.1, except that
the user A’s private information that is escrowed is en-
crypted using a one-time key chosen by A, instead of
ARM ’s. Assume we need to escrow data items ma and
mb:
1. The user A:
(a) Generates a random number r1 and r2,
commit: ca = Commit(ida, r), ca =
Commit(ma, r1), cb = Commit(mb, r2).
(b) Generates a one-time key pair for CSVE
scheme [7]: (KApubCSVE ,KAprivCSVE )
(c) Encrypts ma and mb: CipherCSV E−ma =
EncCSV E(ma;Conditions;KApublicCSV E ),
CipherCSV E−mb =
EncCSV E(mb;Conditions;KApublicCSV E )
(d) Sends KApubCSVE to B
2. A and B engage in PK to verify that ca and cb
are commitments of ma and mb from Cert1, and
CipherCSV E−ma and CipherCSV E−mb are en-
cryption of ma and mb under KApubCSVE (ca and
cb are made available to B as part of this PK)
At this point, B has the correct ciphertexts that hide ma
and mb, but these ciphertexts cannot be decrypted as B
does not have the corresponding private key KAprivCSVE .
Key Escrow As per the key specifications of the
CSVE scheme [7], KAprivCSVE is composed of three
components: x1, x2, x3, each one of them is related to
the public keys in a discrete log relationship: y1 = gx1 ,
y2 = gx2 , y3 = gx3 (g, x1,2,3 and several other public
key components are chosen according to the key gener-
ation algorithm detailed in [7]).
At this stage, we want to escrow KAprivCSVE by
having A encrypt x1, x2, x3 using the PRE scheme
[1]: CipherPRE−x1 = EncPRE(x1;KApublicPRE )(similar operations applies for CipherPRE−x2 and
CipherPRE−x3 . However, we have to make
the PRE scheme verifiable to convince B that
CipherPRE−V EPS−x1,2,3 are proper encryptions of
x1, x2, x3 which are the discrete log values of y1, y2, y3.
For the sake of simplicity, we can make PRE scheme
verifiable by encrypting x1, x2, x3 using PRE scheme
and provide the corresponding proofs of correct encryp-
tion generated according to the verifiable encryption
scheme proposed in [4]. 4 Such proofs can be executed
in a non-interactive fashion.
Therefore, x1, x2, x3 are escrowed as follows:
1. A generates another one-time key pair for the PRE
scheme. Public keys: KApublicPRE = (Z
a1 , ga2),
and the secret keys: KAprivPRE = (a1, a2)
2. A encrypts x1, x2, x3 using the PRE scheme and
generate the proof according to [4]:
CipherPRE−x1,2,3 =
EncPRE(x1,2,3;KApublicPRE ) + Proofs.
3. A sends CipherPRE−x1,2,3 + Proofs to B
4. B verifies that CipherPRE−x1,2,3 are correct en-
cryptions of x1, x2, x3 using the provided Proofs.
5. Start the Initiation part of the RKD protocol
Revocation For revocation of the escrowed private in-
formation, the following steps are performed:
1. B initiates the Construction phase of RKD
2. Once B obtains the re-encryption key, B can re-
encrypt CipherPRE−x1,2,3 to generate
CipherPREA→B−x1,2,3 , which can now be de-
crypted by B to obtain x1, x2, x3.
3. Once x1, x2, x3 are obtained (that is, KAprivCSVE ),
decrypt CipherCSV E−ma and CipherCSV E−mb
to recover ma and mb.
4The verifiable encryption scheme proposed in [4] should not be
confused with CSVE scheme [7]. In CSVE, an encryption scheme
and the corresponding proof system (which is tied to that encryption
scheme only) is provided. However, in [4], a proof system which is
independent of any particular encryption scheme is proposed.
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4.3 Accountability in RKD-PCS
The accountability property of RKD-PCS is the re-
sult of the zero-knowledge referees, implicit key authen-
tication, and correctness properties of RKD. The zero-
knowledge referee property allows the referees to be
‘free of responsibility’ as even when there are more than
t + 1 dishonest referees, the knowledge of r reveals no
information about ga1 or a1 - this provides a disincen-
tive for them to misbehave. The correctness and implicit
key authentication property means that as a result of ex-
ecuting RKD, B can only generate rkA→B , and not any
other re-encryption key. Finally, the private key secrecy
property states that the value of a1 is never revealed.
These properties provide the strong basis that
the only person who can decrypt CipherPRE−x1,2,3
must be B as B is the only entity who can cal-
culate the re-encryption key rkA→B , thus forming
CipherPREA→B−x1,2,3 . This accountability prop-
erty gives an assurance that it is only B who can
learn the user’s escrowed private information (such as
CipherCSV E−ma and CipherCSV E−mb). Referees as-
sist B. However, the referees do not learn any valuable
information in the process (in contrast to threshold en-
cryption scheme (such as [8]) whereby the referees can
learn the plaintext value as long as a certain threshold
is reached). This is an improvement from the UCHVE-
PCS approach [14] whereby no such accountability fea-
ture is provided.
In the full version of this paper [13], we show that
even if we relax the assumption to allow t + 1 referees
to collude with B, the accountability property still holds.
Security Applying RKD into PCS comes with some
security trade-offs. Please refer to the full version of this
paper for details [13]
5. Efficiency and Performance of RKD-PCS
Some optimizations for RKD-PCS are explained in
this section to achieve better efficiency, focusing on re-
ducing the number of resoruce-intensive online modular
exponentiation - modex operations required. With these
optimizations, we show that RKD-PCS is more efficient
than UCHVE-PCS approach [14] - thus better suited for
users using limited-power devices. Please refer to the
full version of this paper at [13] for details.
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